University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1914

The Right to Divert Water to Non-Riparian Land
Ralph W. Aigler
University of Michigan Law School

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1351

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the
Water Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Aigler, Ralph W. "The Right to Divert Water to Non-Riparian Land." Mich. L. Rev. 12 (1914): 304-7.

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository.
For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

THE

RIGHT To DIVERT WATER TO NON-RIPARIAN

LAND.-Though at one

time in England there may have been some doubt as to the character of a
riparian owner's rights in the waters of the stream, it -must be considered as
definitely settled by a series of cases that the doctrine of reasonable use by
all the proprietors on the stream is the rule of the common law, and that the
matter of priority of use or appropriation is, under that system, immaterial,
unless, of course, a question of prescriptive right is involved. Wright v.
Howard, I 1Sim. & 'S. i9o; Mason v. Hill, 3 B. & Ad. 304, 5 id. I; Wood v.
au
W d, 3 Exch. 748; Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353; Sampson v. Hoddinott,
The American
I C. B. (N. S.) 59o, Miner v. Gilnour, 12 Moore P. C. 131.
courts .have generally adopted the view of the law early expressed by Chancellor KENT, which is the view approved by the English courts above referred
to. See 3 KENT, ComIm. *439. The rule of law is clear, the difficulties arise
in its application to particular cases in the determination of the question as to
whether a certain use is reasonable or not. In the second edition of his
splendid treatise on IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, Mr. KINNEY 'has said:
"Under the common law there are three classes of uses which the riparian
proprietors may or may not make of the waters of a stream flowing by their
lands. These are: First, natural or primary uses for which any riparian
proprietor may take the waters of the whole stream; second, artificial uses or
uses which are not classified as those fbr natural wants; and, third; uses of
the water which may not be made at all; such, for example, would be the
use of water by a riparian owner upon non-riparian lands." § 486.
In the first class of uses mentioned by Mr. KINNEY in which, the water is
used for the so-called primary or ordinary or natural purposes, it has been
said by a great ,many courts that it is not unreasonable to abstract w'ater to
such an extent that in the case of small streams the supply is entirely exhausted. MVhzer v. Gilnour, supra; Swindon Water Works Co. v. Wilts &
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Berks Canal Navigation Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 697; Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 15
Conn. 366, 39 Am. Dec. 391; Arnold v. Foot, 12 Wend. 330; Evans v. Merriweather, 3 Scam. 492, 38 Am. Dec. io6; Stanford v. Felt, 71 Cal. 249, I6 Pac.
9oo; Willis v. Perry, 92 Iowa 297, 6o N. W. 727, 26 L. R. A. 124; Lone Tree
Ditch Co. v. Cyclone Ditch Co., 26 S.D. 3o7, 128 N. W. 596; Caviness v. La
Grande Irr. Co., 6o Ore. 410, 119 Pac. 731.

In the second class of cases the

amount of water that may be wholly diverted from the stream depends upon
the volume of -water and the effect of the diversion upon the proprietors lower
down.

Embrey v. Owen, supra; Sampson v. Hoddinott, supra; Swindon

Water Works Case, supra; Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason 397, Fed. Cas. 14,
312; Eliot v. Fitchburg R. Co., io Cush. I9I, 57 Am. Dec. 85. Cases to the
same effect are numerous. However, it is MvIr. KINN Y's third class of cases
with which this note is particularly concerned.
ITit true, as stated, that a riparian proprietor -has no right to use the water
upon non-riparian lands? In the leading English case, which later English
cases have referred to as practically codifying the law of rights in running
streams, the doctrine is laid down that the rights of riparian ownership extend
only to use upon and in connection with an estate which adjoins the stream,
and cannot be stretched to include uses reasonable in themselves, 'But upon
and in connection fvith non-riparian estates. Swindon Water Works Co. v.
Wilts & Berks Canal Navigation Co., L.R. 7 H. L. 687. And in McCartney
v. Londonderry & Lough Swilly Ry. [19o4] A. C. 301, the House of Lords
made a declaration that the railway company, which had been taking water
by a pipe from a river where the railway right of .way crossed same to a tank
about one-half mile distant for use in running the company's engines, had no
right to continue such diversion of water as against the lower riparian proprietor. There the amount of water diverted was so small in relation to the
whole volume of water in the stream that the lower riparian proprietor's mill
could have been run by the diverted water only three minutes in each day.
In both cases the suggestion is made that if the diverting upper owner had
said, "We do not claim a right at all, but what we propose to do is such a
trivial matter that it cannot do you any practical injury," the court might
have thought fit not to interfere. The Lord, Chancellor, in,the McCartney
case, said, "If the question were the reasonableness in respect of quantity,
I should think it a most unreasonable thing that the use of a stream passifig
through a very small area of riparian land should be made to extend to forty
miles of country. * * * Speaking of it simply in respect of quantity, I think
it more unreasonable than 'supplying drinking water to an asylum built on
the banks, which has been held to be unlawful. But, in truth, it is not a question of the quantity at all. * * * The use which they (in this case the railway
company) claim to make of it is not for the purpose of their tenements at
all, but is a use which -virtually amounts to a complete diversion of the
stream. * * * It is a confiscation of the rights of the lower owner."
In the English courts, then, it seems clear that whatever may be the right
of a riparian owner to divert water and consume it upon his riparian lands, 'he
'has no right to abstract water for consumption or -use upon non-riparian
lands, whether owned .by him or not, and regardless of the amount used.
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In this country decisions to the effect that the diversion of water beyond
the watershed or for use upon non-riparian lands is unreasonable and therefore unlawful as against lower riparian owners, are not infrequent. Bathgate
.%Irvine, 126 Cal. 135, 58 Pac. 442, 77 Am. St. Rep. 158; Williams v. Wadsworth, Si Conn. 277; Anderson v. R. Co., 86 Ky. 44, 5 S. W. 49; Crawford
Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 781, 6o L. R. A. 889, io8 Am. St.
Rep. 647; McCarter v. Water Co., 7o N. J. Eq. 525, 61 Atl. 710, 7o N. J. Eq.
695, 65 Atl: 489, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 197, 1.8 Am. St. Rep. 754, 1O Ann. -Cas.
i16; Garwood v. R. R. Co., 83 N. Y. 400, 38 Am. Rep. 452; Pennza. R. R. Co.
v. Miller, 11_ Pa. St. 34, 3 Atk 78o; Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86
S. W. 733, 7o L. R. A. 964, 107 Aon. St. Rep. 653. It may perhaps be said,
however, that in all of these cases the facts showed that the abstracted water
sensibly diminished the supply in the stream and resulted in actual present
or potential damage to the lower owner. Where the amount diverted was
so small as to cause no injury to the present or future use of the lower
riparian land it has been held that the diversion, though for uses unconnected with the enjoyment of riparian lands, was not actionable. Harris v.
Ry. Co., 153 N. C. 542, 69 S. E. 623, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 543, 138 Am. 'St. Rep.
686; Gillis v. Chase, 67 N. H. 161, 31 Atl. 18, 68 Am. St. Rep. 645; Lawrie v.
Silsby, 76 Vt. 24o, 56 Atl. iio6, lO4 Am. St. Rep. 927; Eliot v. Fitchburg R. R.
Co., IO Cush. 191, 57 Am. Dec. 85.
In accord with the cases last cited is the very recent case of Stratton v.
Mt. Hermon Boys' School, (Mass. 1913) lO3 N. E. 87. In that case the
defendant, which owned a tract of riparian land, erected thereon a pumping
plant and diverted water from the stream to other lands beyond the watershed where it was used to supply the manifold needs of a large boys' school.
The defendant requested the court to rule, "in effect that diversion of water
to another non-riparian estate owned by it, was not conclusive evidence that
.the defendant was liable, ,but that the only question was whether it 'had taken
an unreasonable quantity of water under all the circumstances." The court
refused the request, and instructed that "the defendant's right was confined
to a reasonable use of the water for the benefit of its land adjoining, the
water course, and of persons properly using such land, and did not extend
to taking it for use upon other premises, and that if there was such use the
plaintiff was entitled to recover at least nominal damages even though be had
sustained no actual loss." It was -held that the instruction given was erroneous, and the doctrine laid down as applicable to such cases 'was substantially
the charge requested by defendant. "If he diverts out of the watershed or
upon a disconnected estate," said RUGG, C. J, "the only question is whether
there is actual injury to the lower estate for any present or future reasonable use."
The doctrine of the courts of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont
and North Carolina would seem, then, to be in conflict with the rule of the
English-courts. 'What the other courts of this country, even -those above
referred to, would hold in a case where the water 9bstracted for use on nonriparian lands was so small in amount as to cause no actual or potential
injury to the lower owners in the reasonable exercise of their riparian rights,
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is of course problematical. It is submitted that at least in those sections of the
country where the supply of water in streams is abundant the doctrine of the
Massachusetts court as expressed in the Stratton case is preferable to the
strict rule of the English courts.
In streams nature has provided tremendous possibilities for public good,
and it would seem a clear dictate of common sense and a wise public policy
that all possible avail should be made thereof. The common law has declared
that riparian owners, in respect of their riparian lands, shall -have the primary
and perhaps the sole right of use of the waters. For the present purpose it
may be conceded that it is -wise that such persons in respect of such lands
should have the primary right, but it is 'believed that it is not wise to give
them the exclusive right when thereby a portion of nature's gift is squandered.
If the riparian proprietor is assured his primary right of use, he is amply
protected therein by his right of action against any one above, 'whether
riparian owners in the strict sense or not, who makes such a use of the stream
as to result in actual or potential injury. It may well be that proof merely
of such potential injury should not be sufficient basis for a cause of action.
the reason for allowing the action when there is a showing only of possible
future injury is of course to prevent the acquisition of a prescriptive
right. To deny to some member of the public a use of a stream, perhaps to
him very beneficial, merely on the ground that some riparian proprietor
lower down would be injured thereby if he were to make a use of the stream
which he -would be entitled to make but which as a matter of fact he is not
making, thus losing to all this gift of nature, may wvell be said by anyone 'but
the precedent-Avorshipper to be absurd. -If some theory is required to prevent
such use ripening into a prescriptive right, wh3 not imply a license on the
lower owner's part, so'long as his rights are not actually injured, thus meeting
any claim of adverse user by the -tpper owner? In cases such as the -principal case it might be well to consider a diversion of 'water to non-riparian
land as presumptively injurious to the lower owner, thus casting upon the
abstractor the burden of proving that his diversion was, under the circumR. W. A.
stances, lawful.
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